Europe’s energy security is under the spotlight following a series of recent incidents that tested the resilience of its electricity networks. A new report by Ember provides an in-depth analysis of grid failures and highlights the critical role of interconnectors—cross-border infrastructure that allows electricity to flow between countries—not only in preventing and managing blackouts, but also in safeguarding supply against geopolitical threats and sabotage.

The study warns that 55% of Europe’s power system has limited import options, increasing vulnerability to severe disruptions. Countries such as Spain, Ireland, and Finland are particularly exposed, with little support available from neighboring grids in the event of major incidents. The report documents how interconnectors have helped avert large-scale blackouts in Poland, France, and most recently the Iberian Peninsula, and how they have been crucial in maintaining electricity supply in Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic States amid Russian aggression and sabotage campaigns.

Ember emphasizes the urgent need to expand interconnection capacity and secure existing infrastructure, noting that much of Europe still relies on short-term planning and historically underfunded networks. The report recommends a comprehensive approach combining grid modernization, strengthened European supply chains, cross-border cooperation, and both cyber and physical security measures to protect these critical assets.

To gain deeper insight into these findings, Review Energy spoke exclusively with Pawel Czyzak, Interim Europe Programme Director at Ember. In the interview, Czyzak explains why investment in interconnectors should be treated as a long-term strategic priority, how the European Union can incentivize these projects, and what political and financial challenges Europe faces in securing its electricity system against both technical and geopolitical risks.

Review Energy (R.E.): Spain suffered a massive blackout on 28 April and the report indicates that low interconnection increases vulnerability. Do you think national governments and the European Commission have historically underestimated grid security?

Pawel Czyzak (P.C.): Yes, the EU Commission only recently got more involved in grids – with the Grids Action Plan from 2023, and pretty much just this year (2025) started looking into the security of critical infrastructure – with the Action Plan on Cable Security and the wider Preparedness Union Strategy. National governments and grid operators were perhaps more aware of the risks and vulnerabilities, but also somewhat slow to move – struggling to prioritize grid funding, especially interconnectors, that take a long time and require strong political momentum. I think the biggest problem is short-term thinking, not many countries plan beyond a single government’s term, and grid projects are long-term investments.

R.E.: Interconnectors act as an “insurance policy” to prevent blackouts and facilitate renewable integration. Should the EU require countries to invest more in interconnections to guarantee the continent’s energy sovereignty?

P.C.: I think requiring more interconnection investment is legally difficult, but there’s definitely more the EU can do incentivize these investments. One area is financing, and the streamlining of many complicated funding streams currently available for grids. The second area is leadership and facilitation – interconnection projects require cross-border collaboration and have many stakeholders. The EU Commission needs to be the initiator and facilitator of these discussions, otherwise, without external mediation, it’s very difficult for two or more countries to agree on these projects, share the costs, accept technical solutions, agree on financing etc. This is the case for example in Spain, where France is blocking the deployment of more interconnection, despite the very clear benefits for both the Iberian Peninsula and the wider European market.

R.E.: Europe has been the target of sabotage and cyberattacks. Do you believe the defense of critical infrastructure is more a matter of foreign policy and international cooperation than engineering?

P.C.: I think it is indeed largely a matter of politics. Europe needs to properly recognize Russia as a key threat to the continent’s stability. This is widely understood in e.g. Poland, Ukraine or Lithuania, but somewhat ignored in countries like Germany or France. But of course there is some recognition on EU level that needs to turn into action – for example the expansion of the interconnection network, more action on cybersecurity, engineering solutions to protect subsea infrastructure.  

R.E.: Looking ahead to the next five years, what concrete actions should the European Commission prioritize to accelerate the construction and protection of interconnectors, taking into account the need to advance the energy transition?

P.C.: First action, as mentioned above, would be to take a more leading role in facilitating these cross-border projects. Second action is to streamline planning and permitting, as multiple stakeholders are involved and multiple inconsistent planning processes are now needed to deploy infrastructure, especially offshore. Third action would be to coordinate across actors from the grid side and the military side, as they don’t necessarily interact, yet the security of infrastructure is both an energy and a military challenge. Last action would be around technology – incentivizing European supply chains for grid components, and supporting smart and digitized grids that will detect damage faster.

R.E.: What is the estimated cost of strengthening the interconnector network at a European level and how could it be financed? Is it realistic to think of a community-wide plan that combines EU funds with private investment to accelerate these infrastructures?

P.C.: There’s an estimate of around 300bn EUR of investments by 2040, from the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E): https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/tyndp-documents/TYNDP2024/foropinion/Infrastructure_Gaps_Report.pdf. These are financed only partially by EU funding, e.g. the Connecting Europe Facility, then some of it comes from international banks like EIB and EBRD, and the rest is financed by grid operators – so both from national public funding and private funding. But more can definitely be done on improving access to funding, simplifying procedures, and mobilizing more European private capital.